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I.  INTRODUCTION 
For thirty years courts and labor arbitrators have grappled with what constitutes 
sexual harassment and how to remedy such behavior.  The Federal judiciary has 
developed case law on sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.  However, arbitrators addressing this issue under collective bargaining 
agreements have often treated similar fact patterns differently than jurists.  A key 
reason for this difference is that litigation is essentially a zero sum game, the 
respondent is either guilty or not guilty.  In contrast, labor arbitrators decide 
culpability first, and then consider the appropriate remedy.  Regardless of whether an 
arbitrator elects to apply external law, he considers broader concepts of industrial 
jurisprudence in determining what the remedy shall be. This seems to create a chasm 
between arbitral treatment of sexual harassment allegations and that of Federal courts 
under Title VII. 
In reconciling these separate paths for establishing standards of workplace 
conduct, the authors will provide a model that explains how arbitrators decide sexual 
harassment cases and how this model dovetails with the case law developed by the 
Supreme Court since 1986. 
This analysis is intended to be useful to advocates in sexual harassment cases 
brought under a collective bargaining agreement, as well as to arbitrators and 
academicians.  Guidance is provided for a variety of considerations such as selection 
of an arbitrator, framing the issue, effective use of requests for information, and 
much more. 
II.  CASE LAW ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
Section 703(a) of Title VII makes it illegal for, 
An employer - 
(1) To fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s … sex.3 
The terms quid pro quo and ‘hostile work environment’ do not appear in the 
statute.  These terms first appeared in academic literature, found their way into 
decisions of the courts of appeal, and were mentioned for the first time by the 
Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson. 4  The Court indicated that the use 
of the terms quid pro quo and hostile environment is helpful to the extent that they 
illustrate the distinction between cases where a threat is carried out and cases where 
offensive conduct, generally, is proven. 
The concept of quid pro quo has been relatively clear from the outset.  Defining 
under Title VII what conduct creates a hostile work environment has proven to be 
                                                                
342 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a)(1) (2001). 
4Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986). 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol48/iss3/3
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more elusive.5  In the Meritor decision, the Supreme Court set forth tests to 
determine whether the conduct complained of produces a hostile environment.  The 
Court held, “For sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or 
pervasive to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusing 
working environment.”6  These are stringent tests, as demonstrated in the Paula Jones 
case.7  
The Meritor decision was clarified by the Supreme Court in Harris v. Forklift 
Systems Inc.8  The Court again addressed the definition of a hostile work 
environment stating, “[w]hen the workplace is permeated with ‘discriminatory 
intimidation, ridicule, and insult’ that is ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the 
conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment,’ 
Title VII is violated.”9  This reinforced the stringency of the test for hostile work 
environment and gave some guidance for decision-making. 
In the two most recent sexual harassment cases decided by the Supreme Court, 
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,10 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,11 the 
Court continued to discuss what conduct constitutes both quid pro quo and hostile 
environment sexual harassment.  In Burlington Industries, the Court held that  
if an employer demanded sexual favors from an employee in return for a 
job benefit, discrimination with respect to terms or conditions of 
employment was explicit.  Less obvious was whether an employer’s 
sexually demeaning behavior altered terms or conditions of employment 
in violation of Title VII.12 
The Court also reiterated that a hostile environment claim required a showing of 
“severe or pervasive” conduct”, citing its earlier decisions in Oncale v. Sundowner 
Offshore Services, Inc.,13 and in Harris.14  The Faragher decision addressed 
                                                                
5See Stephen M. Crow & Clifford M. Koen, Sexual Harassment: New Challenges for 
Labor Arbitrators, ARB. J., June, 1992, at 6-18, wherein it is noted that “the definition of 
sexual harassment may remain unresolved for several years.” 
6Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67, quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F. 2d 897, 
904 (CA 11 1982); see also, Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998). 
(Emphasis added) 
7Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. Ark. 1998).  
8Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993). 
9Id. at 21. 
10Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752 (1998). 
11Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998). 
12Burlington Indus., 414 U.S. at 752. 
13Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).  Until Oncale, the 
primary focus of both judicial and arbitral decision-making in sexual harassment cases was on 
women victims in supervisor-subordinate, co-worker, and client-employee relationships.  This 
changed with Oncale, which held that Title VII also covered same sex sexual harassment. 
14414 U.S. at 754.  The Court in Burlington Indus. went out of its way to state that it 
expressed no opinion about whether “a single unfulfilled threat is sufficient to constitute 
discrimination in the terms or conditions of employment.” 
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standards established earlier by the Court, noting that they were sufficiently 
demanding to ensure that Title VII did not become a general civility code.15 
While case law on hostile work environment was developed by the Supreme 
Court in the 1980’s and 1990’s, various Federal district courts and courts of appeal 
separately came to their own conclusions about what constituted severe or pervasive 
conduct that altered the terms and conditions of a plaintiff’s employment.  This 
meant that courts provided different results on similar fact patterns.  Thus, the 
determination of what constituted a hostile environment has been at least a two-
decade long “work in progress.” 
III.  MODEL OF ARBITRAL DECISION-MAKING IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES 
Under a collective bargaining agreement, an arbitrator’s mandate is to determine 
whether the employer had just cause for the discipline imposed; not whether the 
complainant’s legal rights had been violated.  As in any just cause case, an arbitrator 
must decide, based on evidence and testimony, whether the employer proved the 
alleged conduct took place, and if proven, whether the penalty fits the offense and 
what the remedy shall be.  This would seem to imply that arbitrators are precluded 
from considering external law in making decisions.   
Some years ago, the National Academy of Arbitrators (NAA) engaged in 
extended, sometimes heated, discussion on this topic.  For most NAA arbitrators, and 
perhaps other arbitrators, that debate may now be moot.  The text of arbitral 
decisions clearly reflects arbitrator recognition that external law and the content of 
collective bargaining agreements are parallel paths for resolution of workplace 
disputes.  No workplace issue shows the influence of external law on arbitral 
decision-making as clearly as sexual harassment.   
Analysis of arbitral sexual harassment cases published in the last five years in 
Labor Arbitration Reports16 and in Labor Arbitration Awards17 showed that the 
preponderance of such cases involved, as in court cases, an allegation of hostile work 
environment. The published awards show some interesting dichotomies in how 
arbitrators view the relationship between conduct and the appropriate penalty.  For 
example, awards reveal the following offense-penalty pattern:18 
Offense:   Penalty: 
Obscene    Discharge  
Vulgar    Suspension 
Foreplay    Unforgivable 
Horseplay    Forgivable 
Touching    Discharge 
Verbal/Visual Abuse   Suspension 
It can be argued that these arbitral dichotomies are consistent with the way 
Federal courts define what constitutes severe or pervasive conduct that alters the 
terms and conditions of another person’s employment.  Where arbitrators encounter 
                                                                
15Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788. 
16The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. (Washington, D.C.). 
17Commerce Clearing House, Inc. (Chicago, Illinois). 
18ANITA CHRISTINE KNOWLTON, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS, JUST CAUSE AND 
THE SEXUAL HARASSER:  WHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY? 3 (1993).  
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol48/iss3/3
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conduct that they consider either severe or pervasive, the tendency appears to be to 
uphold the employer discipline, including termination. Conversely, where less 
offensive conduct occurred; for example, sexual harassment that would not be 
considered severe or pervasive under Federal law, arbitrators appear to review more 
closely the array of procedural issues that may arise in just cause cases.  This 
approach establishes a two-tier process of arbitral decision-making that parallels 
court determinations of whether a severe or pervasive hostile environment sufficient 
to prove illegal conduct under Title VII exists.19  The threshold determination is the 
severity and/or pervasiveness of the conduct at issue.   
For the purpose of this discussion we will refer to those cases where arbitrators 
find either quid pro quo or severe or pervasive conduct, and is so offensive as to alter 
a victim’s terms and conditions of employment, as Type I cases.  Type II will refer to 
those cases that involve only charges relating to creation of a hostile work 
involvement.  
Our analysis shows that in Type I cases, as in serious workplace violence, theft, 
or other major transgressions, arbitrators tend not to engage in deep analysis of 
contextual factors and procedural issues where an employer proves a serious 
transgression has occurred.  Instead, arbitrators generally deal with such severe or 
pervasive sexual harassment as a zero-sum process, if the allegation is proven the 
penalty is upheld. 
Our analysis of the Type II cases shows that arbitrators seem to address cases 
involving an allegation(s) of creating a hostile work environment in the same or a 
similar manner to that which they use in addressing just cause for discipline or 
discharge in other cases.  In fact, the arbitral decision-making in such cases appears 
to follow the “Seven Tests of Just Cause” enunciated by Arbitrator Carroll 
Daugherty in 1966.20  The “seven tests” Daugherty found applicable to just cause 
issues are:  
Test 1.  Did the company give the employee forewarning or foreknowledge of the 
possible or probable disciplinary consequences of the employee’s conduct? 
Test 2.  Was the company’s rule or managerial order reasonably related to (a) the 
orderly, efficient, and safe operation of the company’s business and (b) the 
performance that the company might properly expect of the employee. 
Test 3.  Did the company, before administering discipline to an employee, make 
an effort to discover whether the employee did in fact violate or disobey a rule or an 
order of management? 
Test 4.  Was the company’s investigation conducted fairly and objectively? 
Test 5.  At the investigation did the “judge” obtain substantial evidence or proof 
that the employee was guilty as charged? 
Test 6.  Has the company applied its rules, orders, and penalties evenhandedly 
and without discrimination to all employees? 
                                                                
19This model is similar to that set forth by arbitrator Whitley P. McCoy and discussed in 
EDNA ELKOURI & FRANK ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION WORKS 670-71 (4th ed., 1985); McCoy 
proposes that there are two general classes of offenses, serious offenses where no progressive 
discipline is required and less serious infractions where progressive discipline is appropriate.     
20Enterprise Wire Co. v. Enterprise Indep. Union, 46 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 359 (1966) 
(Daugherty, Arb.).   
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Test 7.  Was the degree of discipline administered by the company in a particular 
case reasonably related to (a) the seriousness of the employee’s proven offense and 
(b) the record of the employee in his service with the company. 
The authors are aware that members of the National Academy of Arbitrators have 
debated, verbally and in print, the seven tests.  It is not the purpose here to engage in 
that debate, but rather to explore how arbitrators have reached conclusions in sexual 
harassment cases.   
Based upon our analysis, we have found, enunciated or not, that arbitrators who 
decide sexual harassment cases, apply, advertently or inadvertently, the ‘seven tests’, 
especially in Type II cases.  We also found that arbitrators may rely upon external 
law in either a Type I or a Type II case.  The results of this analysis, with 
illustrations of both types of cases, follow.21  Section A, Published Policy, addresses 
issues raised in Daugherty’s Tests 1 and 2.  Section B, Investigation of Allegations, 
addresses Tests 3, 4, and 5 and the issues of full investigation, proof of conduct, and 
burden of proof.  Section C, Totality of the Record, addresses Tests 6 and 7 and the 
issues of repeat offenses, disparate treatment, past practice, and mitigation.  The 
issues addressed in Section D, Other, while not directly related to the ‘Seven Tests’, 
are issues that are routinely considered by arbitrators in just cause cases.  These 
issues are off duty/off premises conduct, estoppel, and societal perceptions. 
A.  Published Policy 
Arbitrators consider a published policy on sexual harassment to be a work rule 
that is reasonably promulgated by the employer.  There are occasions, however, 
when a provision of such policy may be questioned as affecting the due process 
rights of either the victim or the accused.  These will be explored in Section B.  Even 
in the absence of a published policy, arbitrators are tending to view the prohibition 
against quid pro quo sexual harassment as ‘common sense’, holding that a proven 
harasser ‘knew or should have known’ the behavior was inappropriate.  
For example, in American Federation of State County and Municipal Employees 
Local 473 v. Chief Judge of the Seventeenth Judicial Court,22 the arbitrator addressed 
the situation of a grievant who was suspended for repeatedly making comments of a 
sexual nature to a female court reporter.  The arbitrator noted, “[t]he grievant in this 
case is a sophisticated, intelligent, articulate man.  Even without an explicit rule, he 
should have known that his leering comments to a co-worker and his attempts to 
corner and kiss her were inappropriate workplace behavior.”23  This case is classified 
as a Type I case because the repeated, improper comments, which could arguably 
support a finding of hostile work environment under Title VII, resulted in the 
arbitrator ignoring the fact that there was no rule prohibiting this conduct. 
A second example of a Type I case is Stark County Sheriff and Fraternal Order 
of Police Ohio Labor Council, Inc.24  This case involved a male correctional officer 
                                                                
21Citations for additional illustrative cases are listed as Endnotes. 
22American Fed. of State, County and Mun. Employees Local 473 v. Chief Judge of the 
Seventeenth Judicial Court, 94-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 3597 (1993) (Nathan, Arb.). 
23Id. at 3603. 
24Stark County Sheriff v. Fraternal Order of Police Ohio Labor Council, Inc., 105 Lab. 
Arb. (BNA) 304 (1995) (Heekin, Arb.). 
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who was discharged for threats, coercion, intimidation, and sexual harassment of 
fellow employees, including grabbing the crotch of a female officer.  The arbitrator 
ruled that the correctional officer could be disciplined, despite the lack of a sexual 
harassment policy, because “the unacceptability of such extreme misconduct towards 
fellow employees, involving sexual terms which are commonly understood and to be 
so off-color as to make a joking context very implausible, precludes the necessity of 
a sexual harassment policy or specific prior notice in this case.”25 
Where Type II cases are concerned it appears that arbitral decision-making can 
be shaped by many factors, and is often unpredictable.  Type II cases illustrate that 
there can be a ‘difference with distinction’ between the way arbitrators perceive, and 
seem to view, the distinction between Type I and Type II cases.  Illustrative of this is 
Prudential Life Insurance Company of America v. United Food and Commercial 
Workers International Union.26  In this case the insurance company issued a male 
agent a written letter of warning, stating that he violated the company’s policy on 
sexual harassment.  On the days that he was required to report to the office, the agent 
had a habit of waiting in the parking lot for a particular female office worker, then 
walking her into the office, often making comments about her appearance, the way 
she walked, and the way she dressed.  One morning, the agent also asked that the 
employee go dancing with him instead of going to work.  The woman was married 
and was worried about how her husband would react if he found out about the 
grievant’s conduct.  She reported the agent’s conduct to her manager, and the 
company decided subsequently to issue a disciplinary letter to the agent.  The 
arbitrator concluded that the letter of warning sought to impose a higher standard of 
conduct than that established by Title VII.  According to the arbitrator, the problem 
with the letter was that the policy relied upon was not clear as to whether it 
incorporated the Title VII standard or, in fact, set a higher standard of conduct.  In so 
ruling, the arbitrator noted that while the company had the right to set a higher 
standard, it must provide notice of the rule so that any employee ‘knew or should 
have known’ the disciplinary consequences of his action.  The arbitrator also 
reasoned that the discipline would stigmatize the employees, and that arbitrators 
apply additional scrutiny to such consequences.  He ordered the company to rescind 
the warning letter stating, “Employers are not justified in taking disciplinary action 
against employees who do not know, or could not have reasonably known, at the 
time of their actions of the possible disciplinary consequences of such actions.”27 
In another Type II case, American Protective Service, Inc. v. American 
Federation of Guards Local 1,28 a female employee was discharged for sending a 
series of graphic love letters to a male supervisor at work.  The grievant’s knowledge 
of the company policy and her admission to sending the letters were important 
factors relied upon by the arbitrator in upholding her discharge, even though there 
was no physical touching or other more aggravated types of sexual harassment.  
                                                                
25Id. 
26Prudential Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. United Food and Commercial Workers Int’l Union, 
94-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 3417 (1993) (Heinsz, Arb.). 
27Id. at 3422. 
28American Protective Serv., Inc. v. American Fed’n of Guards Local 1, 94-2 Lab. Arb. 
Awards (CCH) (1994) (Gentile, Arb.). 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2000
446 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:439 
 
Other factors, which militated against the grievant, were that she was a short-term 
employee (a little over 5 months), some of the conduct complained of occurred while 
she was in a probationary status, and she had filed a complaint under the harassment 
policy.  It is important to note that in some harassment cases poor management, a 
union’s legal duty and/or lack of leadership can cause a case to rise to the arbitration 
level which ‘should,’ and but for these, have been resolved at a lower level in the 
grievance procedure. 
City of Key West v. Individual Grievant,29 provides yet another approach to Type 
II cases regarding published policy.  A police captain with sixteen year’s experience 
was suspended for twenty days and demoted for harassing and otherwise improper 
comments to a female officer.  These comments included telling a female officer that 
“you should have an abortion,” in response to her request for a Christmas Eve leave 
to spend time with her children, and to “bring in knee pads,” pursuant to the officer’s 
request for specific days off to further her education.30  With respect to the Captain’s 
first comment, the arbitrator held “Said behavior was conduct which unreasonably 
interfered with and created an intimidating, hostile, offensive working environment” 
for the victim.”31  While acknowledging that the “knee Pads,” comment was 
“improper” and “humiliating,” the arbitrator held that just cause was lacking to 
discipline the grievant under City policy because “Said statement was not one which 
constituted sexual harassment.  It was not utilized in a manner that was 
demonstrative of or in connection with employment or employment advances based 
or connected with sex or sexual harassment.”32  A conclusion that could be drawn 
from this case, and others cited, is that male arbitrators, who clearly dominate the 
profession and, thus, hear the preponderance of cases, have a major influence in 
determining whether they view a case as Type I or Type II; regardless of the facts. 
Another interesting aspect of Type II cases is revealed in the complex fact pattern 
of the case involving T.J. Max v. Union of Needletrades.33  This case involved, inter 
alia, a claim of sexual harassment.  One of the charges against a male employee was 
gross misconduct for making offensive comments to female employees, even though 
the affected employees disregarded the comments.  The arbitrator found the 
grievant’s conduct was gross or coarse but, under the employer’s policy, his behavior 
did not rise to the level of sexual harassment―unreasonable inference with the 
individual’s job performance or the creation of an intimidating, hostile or offensive 
work environment - because the behavior was disregarded by the women. 
B.  Investigation of Allegation 
Incidents of alleged sexual harassment are replete with elements that can 
adversely affect an investigation and, thus, the due process rights of the grievant.  
Among the more obvious, victims may be reluctant to report offensive behavior at 
all, much less in a timely fashion believing, among other things, they can handle the 
                                                                
29City of Key West v. Individual Grievant, 106 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 651 (1996) (Wolfson, 
Arb.). 
30Id. at 653. 
31Id.  
32Id.  
33T.J. Max v. Union of Needletrades, 107 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 78 (1996) (Richman, Arb.). 
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conduct on their own.  Peer, and other types of pressure, may prevent witnesses from 
coming forward or encourage them to embellish their accounts of the incident.  
Perception may play a large role in how the behavior is interpreted.  The accused 
may be viewed as ‘guilty’ until proven innocent.  Any one of these elements, and a 
host of other similar issues, increase the risk that reversible error will be found or the 
penalty will be reduced. 
A complex example of a Type I case that addresses the issue of the company’s 
investigation is found in Quaker Oats Company v. Retail Wholesale & Department 
Store Union Local 110.34  In this case, a male employee was discharged for allegedly 
sexually harassing a female co-worker by grabbing her breasts on several occasions 
and her buttocks on one occasion.  The union’s defense included a claim that the 
employer’s investigation was “insufficient.”35  The arbitrator upheld the discharge 
finding, inter alia, that the employer “interviewed all of the people who regularly 
worked on the same line with Ms. [C] and the grievant.  The few it did not talk to 
were people who were on the line for only a part of the time that [C] claimed she was 
harassed.”36  He further held that “an investigation cannot be condemned merely 
because it did not include inquiry into every possible lead or a meeting with 
everyone who might have a shred of evidence that was relevant.  The Company’s 
inquiry, while short of perfect, was adequate under the circumstances.”37   
This conclusion was buttressed by the Arbitrator’s conclusions on the sufficiency 
of evidence supplied by the employer.  The evidence noted by the arbitrator 
included: (a) credible, corroborating testimony of [E], a female employee of an 
independent contractor, who did not know and had not conferred with the 
complainant, but had been discouraged from complaining about the grievant’s 
behavior by her supervisor, (b) the independent testimony of both the complainant 
and the corroborating witness [E] that neither of them complained to the employer 
“because they did not want the Grievant to lose his job; they only wanted to be left 
alone,” and (c) the testimony of the complainant that she was afraid to complain to 
“management because she had struck the Grievant and used vulgar language toward 
him, and she thought she might be punished for her behavior.”38  The male arbitrator 
concluded that, “Their behavior is reminiscent of Anita Hill and is equally confusing 
to a male such as the Arbitrator, however, it is not the behavior of a woman who had 
decided to invent a story about the Grievant to get him fired.”39  A back door 
rationalization for the decision, despite the Arbitrator’s findings, was completed in 
his notice that the complainant’s and [E]’s testimony was supported by “the report 
from a fellow employee who was not called as a witness at the arbitration hearing 
                                                                
34Quaker Oats Co. v. Retail Wholesale & Dep’t Store Union Local 110, 95-1 Lab. Arb. 
Awards (CCH) 3188 (1993) (Bernstein, Arb.). 




3995-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) at 3192. 
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that the Grievant had stated [to] that she preferred grabbing [C]’s breasts to those of 
[E].”40 
Certain cases fall clearly in the Type II category.  In some Type II cases 
employers have shown a tendency to accept the statements of the accuser, standing 
alone, as ‘proof’ that the harassment occurred.  In District of Columbia Public 
Schools v. Washington, D.C. Teachers Union,41 a teacher was terminated for alleged 
sexual harassment of a student.  Only the accuser and three witnesses, all identified 
by the accuser, out of a class of nearly thirty witnesses, were interviewed during the 
investigation.  Those witnesses could not corroborate the accuser’s allegations and 
she, in the Arbitrator’s view, had an “adolescent’s view” of what constituted 
harassment (i.e., felt “uncomfortable”).  The Arbitrator noted that, “… the Grievant 
is not without rights.  It is one function of arbitration and the duty of the Arbitrator to 
ensure that he [the Grievant] has been afforded the right of due process, and has been 
treated in conformity with the Law and the Labor Contract…”42   
The arbitrator also wrestled with the meaning of the charge itself, stating, 
[p]art of the problem here is the nature of the charge itself―sexual 
harassment.  The definition has evolved considerably over the past ten 
years, and it has received more public attention and commentary than 
most other charges.  To some individuals, including certain officials 
involved in this case, it is an offense that has no degrees of seriousness—
every sort of sexual harassment is equally heinous.  This Arbitrator 
disagrees with that position.43   
Utilizing a Type II approach, the Arbitrator then found that, as with other standards 
of conduct, there are “major” and “minor” offenses of sexual harassment.  The facts 
of this case caused the Arbitrator to find that the teacher had engaged in 
inappropriate behavior, but that the proper discipline was not termination.  The 
penalty was reduced to a suspension for the school year in which the conduct 
occurred. 
The potential notoriety and liability associated with a claim of sexual harassment 
may be so anxiety producing that an employer rushes to judgment, believing she/he 
“already knows” the accused is capable of the alleged conduct.  These are not 
reasons for disciplining a grievant before the investigation commences.  Beliefs 
about the validity of a complaint should not be basis for determining, a priori, that an 
investigation is unwarranted.   
Another permutation of the due process trap is to immediately credit the accused 
and not the accuser.  In a Type II case, a captain who was a seventeen year veteran of 
the police force, with an excellent record, was suspended for ten days because he did 
not report a clerk’s sexual harassment complaint against a lieutenant because he 
believed the clerk was a disgruntled employee and discounted the complaint.  The 
Department had a clear rule requiring that the complaint be reported to internal 
                                                                
40Id.  
41District of Columbia Pub. Sch. v. Washington, D.C. Teachers Union, 105 La. Arb. 
(BNA) 1037 (1995) (Johnson, Arb.) 
42Id. at 1039. 
43Id. 
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affairs.  Additionally, the grievant chose, in violation of another policy and “common 
sense,” “to identify the accuser to the alleged perpetrator” which “only served to 
pour fuel on the fire.”44  The Arbitrator upheld the suspension, but reduced it to four 
days based on the grievant’s tenure, work record, and the initial decision at the 
divisional level.45 
Due process considerations and timeliness of the complaint were facts in the 
Type II case of Avis Rent A Car Shuttlers v. Teamsters Local 355,46  A male lead 
driver was alleged to have sexually harassed a female co-worker by making lewd 
remarks, suggestive comments, and by touching her.  The victim delayed 
considerably in reporting the conduct because she said she thought she could handle 
it own her own.  When the complaint was received, the grievant was suspended and 
then demoted permanently.  However, the company did not ask the grievant for his 
version and it refused his request for a copy of the charges made against him.  The 
grievant did stop the conduct at issue when he was notified by management that his 
conduct was considered to be sexual harassment. 
The arbitrator upheld the grievance, finding that the company did not conduct a 
proper investigation.  He relied heavily on the contract, citing a provision requiring 
the company to give at least one prior warning in writing before a discharge or 
suspension is meted out.  The suspension was set aside by construing the contract 
language as providing a guarantee of “due process,” including the opportunity to be 
aware of the charges and to defend oneself before discipline is imposed.  The 
permanent demotion was deemed to be excessive and was reduced to a demotion up 
and to the date of the issuance of the arbitrator’s award.  
In a like case, Firestone Rubber and Latex Co. v. Oil, Chemical and Atomic 
Workers International Union Local 4-836,47 a male employee was discharged for 
verbally abusing female and other co-workers.  The arbitrator applied the “seven 
tests” in concluding that the discharge was without just cause because the company 
did not conduct a fair and objective investigation because no effort was made to 
obtain the grievant’s response to the allegations and because no effort was made to 
consider problems that prompted the employee complaints, the veracity of such 
complaints, or verification from the accused that the grievant actually committed the 
actions complained of. 
1.  Due Process Rights 
Arbitrators pay close attention to the due process rights of the grievant and the 
victim in both Type I and Type II cases.  ABTCO, Inc. v. International Woodworkers 
Local III-260,48 is a Type I case which illustrates this point.  A union steward 
                                                                
44City of Houston v. Houston Police Officers Union, 107 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1070, 1075 
(1996) (Sherman, Arb.). 
45Id. at 1076. 
46Avis Rent A Car Shuttlers v. Teamsters Local 355, 105 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1057 (1995) 
(Wahl, Arb.). 
47Firestone Rubber and Latex Co. v. Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Int’l Union Local 
4-836, 107 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 276 (1996) (Koenig, Arb.). 
48ABTCO, Inc. v. International Woodworkers Local III-260, 104 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 551 
(1995) (Kanner, Arb.). 
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attempted to settle a female employee’s complaint of sexual harassment to prevent 
discipline of her harasser who was a fellow bargaining unit member.  The company 
learned independently of the harassment and discharged the harasser, who was 
subject to a “Last Chance Agreement” due to earlier insubordinate and dishonest 
conduct.  The union charged management with interfering in internal union business.  
The arbitrator disagreed, upholding the termination.  He stated that once the 
company learned of the possible violation of the sexual harassment policy, it had an 
absolute right to act to enforce the policy and protect the due process rights of the 
victim.  Failure to do so could subject the company to unwarranted liability from suit 
by the female employee.   
The arbitrator also addressed the grievant’s claim that he was unaware of the 
company’s sexual harassment policy and did not know that pinching the female co-
worker on the buttocks constituted a violation thereof, stating “I am of the view that 
a notice proscribing sexual harassment need not be published or posted by the 
employer in the first instance.  There are certain rules of conduct so well known that 
the employees are deemed aware of them.  Misconduct such as theft, drinking on the 
job, and insubordination, etcetera [sic] need not be codified by written rules and 
disseminated to employees.”49   
Due process concerns also arise in Type II cases like Renton School District v. 
Service Employees International Union Local 6.50  District policy insulated accusers 
from identification to the grievant and to the union until the arbitration hearing.  A 
school custodian was accused of making inappropriate sexual comments to various 
teachers and cafeteria aides.  The arbitrator employed Daugherty’s just cause 
analytical framework, and also integrated the case law of Meritor and Hensen into 
her analysis.  She ruled that the grievant was guilty of sexual harassment and upheld 
his disciplinary demotion.  She also found, however, that the district’s refusal to 
identify the complaining co-workers or provide the details of the complaint until 
arbitration was a denial of due process.  Noting there was no harmful error to the 
grievant, the arbitrator awarded him backpay to make up for his demotion up to the 
date of the arbitration.   
Another type of due process concern arises when an accuser refuses to testify.  
Arbitrators may elect to draw a negative inference, even if the complainant alleges 
fear of physical harm.  This negative inference can be drawn against the claim itself, 
or may be found in the arbitrator’s review of the penalty.  In Metropolitan Council 
Transit Operations v. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1005,51 the arbitrator found 
the grievant guilty as charged, but reduced his suspension from thirty to fifteen days 
because the only direct testimony was the grievant’s own admission against interest.  
The complainant alleged she was fearful for her life due to reported threats and other 
incidents to discourage her involvement in the arbitration.  The arbitrator allowed her 
affidavit into evidence, but credited only those allegations that were admitted by the 
grievant in his testimony to produce a Type II remedy. 
                                                                
49Id. at 554. 
50Renton Sch. Dist. v. Service Employees Int’l Union Local 6, 102 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 854) 
(1994) (Wilkinson, Arb.). 
51Metropolitan Council Transit Operations v. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1005, 
106 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 68 (1996) (Daly, Arb.). 
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Double jeopardy has also been addressed in Type II cases.  In USAF 82 
MSSO/MSCE Base, Sheppard AFB, Texas v. National Federation of Federal 
Employees Local,52 a federal agency suspended a training instructor for sexual 
harassment eleven months after it had issued him an oral admonishment for the same 
offenses.  The arbitrator found the agency did not have the right, under any 
applicable law, rule, regulation, or the collective bargaining agreement, to cancel the 
admonishment and then issue a second disciplinary action.  The same principle 
applied in All West Container Company v. Graphic Communications Union, District 
Council No. 2.53  An employer suspended a male employee for sexual harassment 
one year after it had issued him a verbal warning for the same incident.  The 
arbitrator rescinded the suspension that he considered to be double jeopardy.    
2.  Burden of Proof  
A burden of proof determination is likely to be influenced by the standards of 
behavior in the workplace.  In less salient cases involving the claim of sexual 
harassment, whistles and hoots in the workplace cannot be translated into a bona fide 
case of sexual harassment when it is shown that this behavior is displayed to mixed 
sex employees on a regular and repetitive basis, and is tolerated, not only by the 
employees (many of whom engage in such behavior) but also by the employer.  This 
is a problem, if recognized by the employer, that needs to be solved by putting 
employees and the union on notice that such behavior will not be tolerated, and by 
giving a reasonable period to comply. 
In Penn Hills, PA School District and Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1552, 
107 LA 566 (O’Connell), a Type II case, the arbitrator held that the grievant engaged 
in annoying behavior and exhibited poor judgment, but was not guilty of sexual 
harassment because there was no touching or harassing language.  The grievant, a 
male bus driver, had been discharged for misconduct with a substitute teacher. He 
tried to engage her in conversation, asked her for dates, and even showed up at her 
residence uninvited.  The arbitrator converted the discharge into a suspension that 
included the upcoming Fall semester. 
3.  Proof of Conduct 
Determining whether the offense alleged is proven is an essential part of 
investigation.  Many sexual harassment cases involve an accuser’s word against that 
of her/his alleged harasser, the so-called “he said, she said” incidents.  Credibility 
determinations are key in shaping an arbitrator’s decision in both Type I and Type II 
cases.  Motive, corroboration, past incidents of similar conduct, and rational 
reasoning are among the factors arbitrators credit in making credibility 
determinations.  
Vista Chemical Company v. Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International 
Union Local 4-555,54 is a Type I case.  A recently assigned eighteen year old female 
                                                                
52USAF 82 MSSO/MSCE Base, Sheppard AFB, Texas v. National Fed’n of Fed. 
Employees Local 799, 107 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1089 (1997) (Stephens, Arb.). 
53All West Container Co. v. Graphic Communications Union, District Council No. 2, 109 
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1208 (1997) (Riker, Arb.). 
54Vista Chem. Co. v. Oil, Chem. and Atomic Workers Int’l Union Local 4-555, 104 Lab. 
Arb. (BNA) 818 (1995) (Nicholas, Arb.). 
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security guard accused a male employee of sexual harassment by asking personal 
questions about her life and her fiancée, asking if she would accept a gift, hugging 
her at the guardhouse and continuing to bother her.  The grievant had been accused 
of sexual harassment by five other female security guards over the three years 
preceding these events.  The company investigated one of these allegations and, 
when the grievant denied any wrongdoing, no further action was taken.  The 
arbitrator began his work by establishing the standard of proof required for the 
company to prevail.  He said sexual harassment is a serious allegation to which a 
stigma is attached and, thus, the standard of proof that has to be met is “clear and 
convincing,” rather than a “preponderance” of the evidence.55  The arbitrator went on 
to state,  
I am left with the distinct impression that [the accuser] did not fictionalize 
the charges she makes against the Grievant.  Indeed, I find no motive 
whatsoever for [the accuser] to have done so.  She hardly knew the 
Grievant, and for her to concoct such a story against Grievant does not 
come with a logical foundation.56   
He then moved easily to the conclusion that “the severest discipline available, 
summary discharge” was the appropriate penalty.  The arbitrator went on to add, “To 
say that sexual harassment is serious misconduct borders on understatement.  Given 
the development of civil rights law in recent years and the potential for liability 
which Company faces from permitting such conduct to go unchecked in its 
workplace, I must concur with Company’s position that discharge was the only 
reasonable response to Grievant’s actions.”57 
Rational reasoning and corroboration were central factors in a Type I case 
involving City of Orlando Police Department v. Individual Grievant.58  The 
arbitrator applied the ‘clear and convincing’ standard, but acknowledged that 
“Impressions of credibility are ephemeral at best, and must reside in the subjective 
eye of the beholder.”59  In this case, the accuser made significant admissions against 
interest, telling the grievant she loved him.   
She admitted she believed a friendship with a superior officer would help 
her career and that [grievant] was in a position to further her career.  Until 
the day in late February when she told [the grievant] she would not leave 
her husband, she apparently never once told [him] his attentions were 
unwelcome.  At that point, I would conclude that [the accuser’s] 
complaint of sexual harassment would fail to meet the test set forth in 
Henson and Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S.60   
                                                                
55Id. at 821. 
56Id. at 822. 
57Id. (emphasis added). 
58City of Orlando Police Dep’t v. Individual Grievant, 109 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1174 (1998) 
(Sweeney, Arb.). 
59Id. at 1182. 
60Id. 
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In a split decision, the arbitrator did rule in the accuser’s favor where the charges of 
hostile work environment are concerned.  Factors which contributed to this result 
included: controversion of the grievant’s testimony by a superior officer about why 
the accuser was subjected to a special evaluation “following an outstanding regular 
evaluation by a period of a few weeks;” “sudden and dramatic changes in [the 
accuser’s] work environment, her removal from her position as Assistant Squad 
Leader;” “[the accuser’s] testimony is detailed, containing content which must have 
been personally embarrassing and includes [so many] unlikely instances . . . that I 
cannot accept the premise that she invented these incidents in an effort to discredit 
her supervisor,” and testimony by another female officer that she had been subjected 
to similar offensive conduct by the grievant.61 
Hughes Family Markets, Inc. v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union 
Local 770,62 is a classic “he said, she said’ case, where the grievant also had the 
advantage of being a long service employee.  A Service Manager’s testimony about 
the accuser’s nervousness, request to accompany her to her vehicle, and personal 
observation of the grievant staring at her were important in establishing the accuser’s 
credibility.  Additionally, the grievant had received a written warning three years 
before “for making sexual comments to a female” employee who no longer worked 
for the employer.63  The arbitrator upheld the grievant’s discharge, concluding “The 
‘pattern’ aspects of the Grievant’s alleged behavior” adversely affected the accuser 
“in her role as a worker.”64 
The next two cases illustrate that just cause for discipline exists when it is proven 
that an employee has harassed a member of the public.  A male train conductor was 
discharged in a Type I case involving the Chicago Transit Authority v. Amalgamated 
Transit Union Local 308.65  He enticed a female passenger to get into his unoccupied 
car at a station and proceeded to expose himself, attempted to fondle her, tried to 
remove her clothes, and when the passenger refused to give oral sex, masturbated to 
ejaculation.  The passenger exited the train at the next stop and reported the 
conductor to the police, who arrested him.  The conductor initially denied everything 
but when ejaculation stains were found on his uniform, the grievant admitted his 
behavior to management.  The arbitrator found the passenger’s testimony was 
credible, whereas the grievant’s was not and he admitted to lying during the 
disciplinary investigation, and denied the grievance. 
EPA v. American Federation of Government Employees Local 3347,66 is a Type 
II case wherein a government agency meted out a three-day suspension to a male 
team leader for making inappropriate sexual remarks to a female contractor’s 
                                                                
61Id.  
62Hughes Family Mkts., Inc. v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 770, 
97-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 3853 (1996) (Grabuskie, Arb.). 
63Id. at 3855. 
64Id. at 3860. 
65Chicago Transit Auth. v. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 308, 94-1 Lab. Arb. Awards 
(CCH) 4271 (1994) (Stallworth, Arb.). 
66EPA v. American Fed’n of Gov’t Employees Local 3347, 102 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1046 
(Smith, Arb.). 
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representative.  The grievant denied making some comments and asserted that the 
representative took others out of context.  The arbitrator denied the grievance, stating 
that although this is a ‘he said, she said’ case, the grievant’s testimony was not 
credible, whereas the contractor’s representative had no motive to lie about the 
matter. 
Same sex harassment was the subject of a Type I case in Hughes Aircraft 
Company v. Electronic and Space Technicians Local 1553.67  The grievant denied 
every allegation made by his co-workers.  The arbitrator upheld the discharge 
stating, “If the grievant is to be believed, the three employees must have gone to 
great lengths and efforts to coordinate their detailed testimonies regarding the 
Grievant’s behavior.”68  The arbitrator also noted that a union witness and a 
manager’s notes both corroborated the “detailed, specific and consistent” testimony 
of the three complaining employees.69  She concluded that “the Grievant’s denial of 
every one of these incidents testified to by other witnesses is, in light of all these 
considerations, simply not credible.”70 
Arbitrators deciding Type II cases tend to rely on more subtle elements of just 
cause in determining whether a grievance should be sustained or denied.  For 
example, when the grievant did not testify at the hearing, the arbitrator drew a 
negative inference in Safeway, Inc. v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union 
Local 588.71  A male food clerk was discharged for sexually harassing female 
employees; such conduct including improper touching and inappropriate comments.  
The arbitrator upheld the discharge stating that the evidence of the grievant’s actions, 
as presented by the female employees and other witnesses, was unrebutted and 
therefore must be accepted as fact. 
Extensive analysis of the evidentiary record was not the primary concern of the 
arbitrator in Grievant v. City of Austin,72 because “[t]he record plainly demonstrates 
that this has already been established.”73  A male police lieutenant was suspended 
and demoted for sexual harassment of, and immoral conduct toward, a female police 
dispatcher.  These officers had been dating but the dispatcher sought to break off the 
relationship.  When the grievant did not comply, a meeting was held and the chief of 
police gave the grievant a formal letter of warning, which was also placed in the 
lieutenant’s personnel file.  It was subsequently proven that he made calls to the 
dispatcher’s home.  The arbitrator concurred with the chief’s assessment that this 
constituted “insubordination, in violation of Department Rule 60” because the 
lieutenant has been “on notice that he was to refrain from having any further contact 
                                                                
67Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Electronic and Space Technicians Local 1553, 94-2 Lab. Arb. 
Awards (CCH) 4798 (1993) (Bickner, Arb.). 
68Id. at 4804. 
69Id. 
70Id. 
71Safeway, Inc. v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 588, 105 Lab. Arb. 
(BNA) 718 (1995) (Goldberg, Arb.). 
72Grievant v. City of Austin, 95-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 3395 (1995) (Fogelberg). 
73Id. 
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with the dispatcher.”74  The thirty-day suspension was upheld, but the grievance was 
sustained with respect to demotion. 
C.  Totality of Record 
The totality of the record is an important consideration in determining whether 
the discipline meted out is appropriate for a proven sexual harassment offense and 
should, therefore, be sustained.  This is especially pertinent in Type II cases.  
Whether the grievant’s total record with the company exacerbates or mitigates the 
complaint is unique to each case.  For example, a grievant with an active record of 
discipline for another unrelated offense(s) may be subject to the next level of 
progressive discipline, up to and including discharge, even if this is the first sexual 
harassment offense.  Conversely, a discharge is the likely result for repeated 
harassment offenses, especially if corrective action is of no avail.  This is true even if 
progressive discipline is not adhered to and/or other mitigating factors are in a 
grievant’s favor.  As in other just cause cases, disparate treatment and past practice 
can also influence an arbitrator’s decision whether the discipline is appropriate for a 
proven offense.  
In GTE California Inc. v. Communication Workers,75  a grievant with years of 
service with the company was terminated for creating a hostile work environment.  
He had previously been given two five-day suspensions, one for verbal abuse and 
one for sexual harassment.  The grievant’s earlier comments included anti-Filipino, 
anti-white, anti-female, and age discriminatory remarks.  He continued to make 
hostile and offensive comments to fellow employees, but he did not make any clearly 
discriminatory or sexually hostile comments.  The arbitrator concluded “[i]t is clear 
that any of these comments alone made by the grievant appear relatively harmless, 
however, where the pattern is at a level where employees go out of their way to 
avoid him, or dread coming to work, a serious problem exists that cannot be 
ignored.”76  The arbitrator also considered that the company had a duty to provide an 
harassment free workplace and that the grievant was aware of the policy but 
“continued to create a hostile environment” by his comments.77  The arbitrator 
considered the grievant’s prior discipline, together with his unabated behavior, and 
upheld the discharge. 
Recidivism and notice were issues in City of Las Vegas v. Las Vegas City 
Employees Association.78  The city discharged a male foreman who brushed his body 
against a female employee three times in one month and, on another occasion, 
hugged and kissed her as a ‘thank you’ for driving him home.  The foreman had 
received a written reprimand for earlier harassing conduct and had been required to 
attend sexual harassment classes.  In upholding the discharge, the arbitrator found 
                                                                
74Id. at 3398. 
75GTE California Inc. v. Communication Workers, 103 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 343 (1994) 
(Grabuskie, Arb.). 
76Id. at 350. 
77Id. 
78City of Las Vegas v. Las Vegas City Employees Assoc., 107 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 654 
(1996) (Bergeson, Arb.). 
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these actions to constitute ample notice to the grievant of the impropriety of his 
conduct.  
As illustrated by Pacific Bell v. Communication Workers,79 arbitrators tend to 
treat repeat sexual harassment following counseling in the same manner as drug and 
alcohol abuse cases.  When recidivism occurs after counseling, the stage is set for 
further discipline, usually discharge.  Most arbitrators uphold the discharge in these 
instances. 
As illustrated by Pepsi Cola Bottling,80 these principles apply equally in cases 
where an employee harasses customers.  In this case, a uniformed driver, prior to 
being terminated, had been warned several times, suspended twice, and had been 
issued a final warning about making sexual comments to and/or having physical 
contact with customers or employees of customers.  Evidence was “abundant that 
Grievant established a pattern of engaging in inappropriate conduct of a sexual 
nature while performing his job.”81  In upholding the discharge, the arbitrator said 
“His [the grievant’s] conduct was more egregious since it involved customers of the 
Company,” and the incident which gave rise to his discharge “was the last straw.”82  
This case is even more significant because it addresses whether quid pro quo 
harassment can be found in circumstances involving customers.  This arbitrator said, 
“The evidence shows that Grievant offered product to a couple of employees of 
customers for favors.  These offers were declined and no product ever changed 
hands.  I agree with the Union that this allegation falls short of just cause for 
discharge.”83 
An important ‘mixed’ case involving prior discipline for lateness and failure to 
perform assigned duties by a uniformed driver, and for sexual harassment of a 
company customer’s female employee was cause for discharge according to the 
arbitrator in Golden States Foods Corporation v. International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters Local No. 104.84  With respect to both matters, the arbitrator took 
judicious note that none of the previous discipline was grieved and, thus, was not at 
issue in the instant case.  Based upon the grievant’s prior discipline, the totality of 
the record, and his self-serving testimony, the arbitrator concluded that the grievant 
“knew or should have known” what behavior was expected of him not only at the 
worksite but equally in terms of the standards expected of him in dealing with 
customer employees.  She further noted that the grievant had bid on a route from 
which he had been removed because of previous harassment complaints.  
Notwithstanding the fact that management had restored grievant to the route, the 
arbitrator chastised the grievant for even bidding on the route. 
                                                                
79Pacific Bell v. Communication Workers, 98-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH), 5795 (1997) 
(Oestreich, Arb.). 
80Pepsi Cola Bottling, 97-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 993 (1997) (Thornell, Arb.). 
81Id. at 994. 
82Id. 
83Id. 
84Golden States Foods Corp. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters Local No. 104, 97-2 Lab. 
Arb. Awards (CCH) 4412 (1997) (Rivera, Arb.). 
18https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol48/iss3/3
2000] SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE 457 
From our analysis of Iowa (Department of Transportation) v. American 
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Iowa Council,85 we see that 
arbitrators appear to give considerable weight to disparate treatment in sexual 
harassment cases.  Here, the grievant had made sexual comments, told jokes of a 
sexual nature, and made sexual innuendoes to female co-workers.  The allegations 
were supported by credible testimony and the grievant was issued a ten-day 
suspension.  Another male employee participated in the same behavior but received a 
written reprimand.  The arbitrator reduced the grievant’s suspension to a written 
reprimand, stating that the company failed to apply its rules, orders, and penalties 
evenhandedly. 
Sometimes it appears that arbitrators stretch the limits of Type II analysis in 
deciding sexual harassment cases where disparate treatment is concerned.  A case in 
point is Metropolitan Transit Commission v. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 
1005.86  The only female employee in the shop had been subjected to harassment for 
five years and was touched on the breast by a male co-worker.  As a result of an 
EEOC investigation, the male co-worker and four other male employees were 
discharged.  A total of thirteen disciplinary actions were taken against men in the 
shop due to their harassment of the complainant.  The arbitrator was persuaded that 
the grievant committed the harassment alleged, but reinstated him without backpay 
because it was shown that a foreman received no discipline for similarly sexually 
harassing the victim.  The arbitrator stated, “Zero tolerance for sexual touching is a 
commendable policy to follow, however, it is imperative that employees know this is 
the policy when it discovers management acting contrary to it.  Consequently, while 
the Grievant’s long service to the Employer and his prior record of no discipline 
would not normally be considered sufficient to mitigate the discipline by the 
Employer for his behavior, it is considered under these circumstances and 
determined that the discipline imposed should be something less than discharge.”87  
This is a significant decision because it suggests that, like alcohol and drug testing 
applied only to bargaining unit members, the discipline may be reduced if the union 
can prove that management, or other employees, also engaged in the type of behavior 
that led to the complaint.  This is especially true where mitigating circumstances are 
found. 
Such circumstances were found by the arbitrator in Simkins Industries Inc. v. 
United Paperworkers International Union Local 214.88  In this case a male leadman 
was discharged by the company for sexually harassing female employees.  Five 
female employees alleged that the grievant harassed them, asserting also that he had 
influence with management.  The union challenged the discharge, contending that 
the company treated supervisors who committed harassment more leniently than the 
grievant.  The arbitrator disagreed, finding that the company dealt with management 
personnel involved in a fairly rigorous and fair fashion. 
                                                                
85Iowa (Department of Transportation) v. American Fed. of State, County and Mun. 
Employees, Iowa Council, 94-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 5227 (1993) (Clark, Arb.). 
86Metropolitan Transit Comm’n v. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1005, 106 Lab. Arb. 
360 (1996) (Imes, Arb.). 
87Id. at 364. 
88Simkins Indus. Inc. v. United Paperworkers Int’l Union Local 214, 106 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 
551 (1996) (Fullmer, Arb.). 
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Arbitral consideration of the totality of the record can include consideration of 
past practice with varying results.  For example, in United Transportation Union 
Local No. 23 v. Santa Cruz Metropolitan Transit District,89 a male employee was 
suspended for ten-days because his remarks to a female supervisor created a hostile 
environment.  The grievant took issue with his supervisor’s report of his on-the-job 
vehicular accident by uttering offensive and obscene remarks to her.  The union 
contended that since the supervisor declined to file a sexual harassment complaint, 
past practice supported a finding that no discipline should have been given.  The 
arbitrator found that no past practice existed and upheld the grievant’s discipline. 
The case Nebraska Department of Correctional Services v. Nebraska Association 
of Public Employees, AFSCME Local 61,90 produced a different result based upon 
past practice.  Here the state terminated a male mental health counselor for failing to 
report an incident of sexual harassment when he was an on-site supervisor.  Part of 
the union’s attack on this penalty charged that all employees who harassed a fellow 
employee had not been discharged.  The union also argued that the counselor’s 
failure to report the incident did not warrant more severe discipline than the harasser 
received.  The arbitrator agreed and reduced the discipline to a six-month 
disciplinary probation stating, “it is difficult to find that a single failure to report an 
incident of sexual harassment warrants more severe discipline than some instances of 
actual harassment.”91  She also noted that the grievant had no prior record of 
discipline and that the degree of discipline imposed was not consistent with the 
principles of progressive discipline. 
D.  Other Pertinent Considerations 
1.  Off Duty/Off Premises Conduct 
Sexual harassment that occurs off duty and/or off premises has been a particular 
challenge to the parties and to arbitrators.  In discipline cases, most arbitrators 
require the employer to establish a nexus between the behavior at issue and the 
company’s interests.  The difficulty in establishing the requisite nexus between 
conduct and interest is reflected in the arbitral decisions made in sexual harassment 
cases. 
In Superior Coffee and Foods and Wholesale Delivery Drivers Local 848,92 a 
Type I case involving egregious sexual harassment, a male salesperson was 
discharged for sexually harassing two female employees while off duty.  The 
conduct occurred at a company sponsored social event two hundred miles from the 
company’s offices.  The arbitrator upheld the discipline stating, “[s]exual harassment 
at a Company-sponsored event like the . . . conference, would be work related.”93  
                                                                
89United Transportation Union Local No. 23 v. Santa Cruz Metro. Transit Dist., 94-2 Lab. 
Arb. Awards (CCH) 5192 (1994) (Pool, Arb.). 
90Nebraska Dep’t of Correctional Servs. v. Nebraska Assoc. of Pub. Employees, AFSCME 
Local 61, 107 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 910 (1996) (Imes, Arb.). 
91Id. at 916.  
92Superior Coffee and Foods v. Wholesale Delivery Drivers Local 848, 103 Lab. Arb. 
(BNA) 609 (1994) (Alleywe, Arb.). 
93Id. at 612. 
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The arbitrator also rejected efforts to have the penalty reduced because the grievant 
was drunk, stating:  “Nor am I impressed with the rationale of the Union’s cited case, 
AFG Industries, that lack of employer supervision over a drunken sexual harasser 
can alone void a discharge for sexual harassment.  My reliance on it would be 
misplaced, I believe, because it fails to hold the offending employee accountable for 
his own misconduct.  Drunk sexual harassers and drunk drivers are equally 
accountable for the consequences of their conduct.  Were it otherwise, an employee 
desiring to sexually harass another employee, and aware that to harass while sober 
would result in discharge, could drink 10 to 15 beers, as grievant here admitted 
doing, harass the employee and rely on drunkenness as a bar to discharge.”94 
Conversely, in City of Toronto v. Fraternal Order of Police, Fort Steuben Lodge 
No. 1,95 a Type II case, the arbitrator overturned the discharge of a male police 
officer that “consorted” with a female civilian.  The officer had been ordered by his 
superiors not to see the woman, but had ignored the order.  The officer was found in 
a state of undress at the woman’s house.  He was terminated for disobeying a direct 
order, inference in an official investigation, obstructing official business, and 
harassment.  The arbitrator reinstated the officer, in part, because he was off duty 
when he was with the civilian.  The arbitrator noted that the collective bargaining 
agreement barred the city from disciplining officers for off-duty conduct, except for 
serious crimes.  The arbitrator concluded the officer’s actions failed to rise to the 
level of a serious crime, and thus, was beyond the reach of the city’s disciplinary 
jurisdiction. 
Kelly Springfield Tire Co. v. United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers 
Local 746,96 also addressed the issue of off duty conduct.  In this case, the company 
discharged a male employee for sexually harassing a female co-worker by 
telephoning her at home and making ‘kissing sounds’ over a period of three months.  
The victim, with the assistance of the Sheriff’s department, eventually discovered the 
identify of the person making the calls.  She reported this to the company and the 
grievant was discharged.  The company based its defense on the Meritor and Harris 
cases, as well as on arbitral precedent.  Analogous to the Paula Jones case, the 
arbitrator concluded that this off duty conduct did not measure up to the generally 
recognized standards for creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive working 
environment because there was no showing that the victim’s work performance was 
harmed by the grievant’s conduct.  He sustained the grievance and reinstated the 
grievant with full seniority and benefits, but without backpay. 
A contrasting decision is represented by Michigan Department of Transportation 
v. United Technical Employees Association.97  A male employee was suspended for 
three days for writing offensive allusions to the upper torso of a female instructor on 
an off premises seminar evaluation form.  The union protested the discipline, noting 
                                                                
94Id. at 614. 
95City of Toronto v. Fraternal Order of Police, Fort Steuben Lodge No. 1, 102 Lab. Arb. 
(BNA) 645 (1994) (Duff, Arb.). 
96Kelly Springfield Tire Co. v. United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers Local 
746, 94-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 4693 (1993) (Britton, Arb.). 
97Michigan Dep’t of Transp. v. United Technical Employees Assoc., 104 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 
1196 (1995) (Kelman, Arb.). 
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that the instructor was not a state employee, but rather was an independent contractor 
and, thus, was not subject to the sexual harassment policy.  The arbitrator considered 
Meritor and Harris in deciding the isolated remark constituted “verbal harassment”, 
but was not severe enough to create a hostile work environment under the law.  He 
also found that “With or without a specifically applicable work rule, there is no 
unfairness” to the grievant, but ruled that progressive discipline should apply so the 
three-day suspension was reduced to a letter of warning.98   
It should also be noted that disciplinary action regarding off duty/off premises 
conduct may be constrained by external law, i.e., constitutional or statutory rights.  
For example, the State of New York has legislation that protects various types of 
conduct that employees engage in while off duty.  Public employers may also face 
constitutional restraints.  
2.  Estoppel 
The determination of another administrative agency usually will not be honored 
in an arbitration proceeding to determine whether just cause existed for discipline 
based upon allegations of sexual harassment.  This is because the issue before the 
agency may not be the same and/or the legal standards, underlying law, and burden 
of proof are often different than in arbitration.  Moreover, an arbitrator is empowered 
to decide the case pursuant to the contract, not administrative law.  These are the 
same principles that apply in other just cause cases where an effort is made by either 
party to introduce evidence from a worker’s compensation or unemployment 
compensation proceeding. 
Potlach Corporation v. United Paperworkers International Local 1532,99 a Type 
I case, illustrates these points.  The company discharged a long service employee for 
sexual harassment of several female co-workers.  The grievant filed for and was 
subsequently awarded unemployment compensation.  At the arbitration hearing, the 
union argued that the unemployment agency ruling supported a finding that the 
company did not have just cause to terminate the grievant.  The arbitrator upheld the 
discharge stating “As the arbitrator does not have the authority to interpret Arkansas 
unemployment law, the Arkansas Employment Security Department does not have 
the authority to interpret the collective bargaining agreement unless agreed to by the 
parties.”100 
3.  Societal Perceptions 
Over the last two decades, as the courts have struggled to define the concept of 
sexual harassment, societal perceptions of what constitutes such harassment have 
changed a great deal. Both courts and arbitrators have found navigating the waters of 
dispute resolution in sexual harassment cases a challenging task.  As is evident 
elsewhere in this article, arbitral perceptions of sexual harassment have mirrored the 
crosscurrents.   
                                                                
98Id. at 1200. 
99Potlach Corp. v. United Paperworkers Int’l Local 1532, 104 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 691 (1995) 
(Moore, Arb.). 
100Id. at 694. 
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In International Mill Service v. United States Steelworkers, District 34,101 a Type 
I case, a male employee was discharged because he repeatedly sexually harassed a 
female co-worker by using “sexually suggestive language” and engaged in “sexually 
explicit behavior.”  At the arbitration hearing the grievant claimed he was only 
“teasing and playing” and treated the entire situation as a “big joke.”  The arbitrator 
upheld the termination finding that “sexual jokes, posters, propositions, and the like 
that were loosely tolerated as a workplace norm 20 years ago are unacceptable and 
illegal today.”102 
In another type I case, Indiana Gas Company, Inc. v. International Brotherhood 
of Electrical Workers Local 1392,103 a male service technician was suspended for 
inappropriate remarks and for the unsolicited touching of a female teenage customer 
during a service call.  The technician had also made improper remarks to female 
employees on previous occasions.  A critical feature of the hearing was that the 
teenager was not presented to testify, causing the union to claim that the company’s 
case was built on hearsay and arguing its disadvantage because she was not available 
for cross-examination.  The arbitrator responded to the absence of the teenager by 
noting that management “had a very high hurdle to jump over to prove their case” in 
the teenager’s absence.104  Addressing the merits of the case, the arbitrator said that 
“in recent years, people’s sensivity to what is said to or about them has increased 
greatly” and that “People are more likely to take offense to remarks, and are more 
likely to complain about what they perceive to be offensive behavior.”105  The 
arbitrator then tied these views to the nature of the company’s business by stating 
that “all employees, and in particular those who come into contact with customers, 
must be very careful about how they interact with customers, and/or the public at 
large while they are representing the Company.”106  The grievance was denied. 
Even same sex harassment was found to be unacceptable in a third example of a 
Type I case.  In City of Fort Worth v. Individual Grievant,107 a male supervisor was 
terminated because he approached a male trainee from behind, put his hands in the 
trainee’s front pants pockets, pulled him close, and held him in that position for 10 to 
15 seconds.  The grievant’s defense was that he was merely “goosing” the victim, 
that he was merely engaging in “horse play”, and that he was merely doing the same 
things that were done to him when he was a trainee twenty-two years ago.  Integral 
to the arbitrator’s ruling was a city policy that stated explicitly that “No employee, 
either male or female, shall be subjected to unsolicited and unwelcome sexual 
                                                                
101International Mill Serv. v. United States Steelworkers, Dist. 34, 95-2 Lab. Arb. Awards 
(CCH) 4622 (1995) (Marino, Arb.). 
102Id. at 4626. 
103Indiana Gas Co., Inc. v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 1392, 106 Lab. Arb. 
(BNA) 117 (1997) (Imundo, Arb.). 
104Id. at 121. 
105Id. at 123. 
106Id. 
107City of Fort Worth v. Individual Grievant, 108 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 924 (1997) (Moore, 
Arb.). 
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overtures or conduct, either verbal or physical.”108  The arbitrator recognized that 
horseplay can “be considered consensual on occasions,” but in order for that 
interpretation to apply “the victim of the horseplay must have laid a predicate prior 
to the action having been taken that he welcomed, invited or accepted the action 
directed towards him.”109   
The arbitrator also had to grapple with a claim of disparate treatment because 
another supervisor had received a three-day suspension two years ago for similar 
conduct.  The matter of disparate treatment was overcome because the city was able 
to demonstrate to the arbitrator’s satisfaction that the previous incident created a 
“water shed,” the result of which was a thorough review of “policy regarding the 
elimination of hostile work environment” and sensitivity training for all 
employees.110  The incident complained of occurred after these things had occurred.  
In dismissing the grievance, the arbitrator concluded that the grievant’s conduct, “. . . 
cannot be excused because it was done to the Appellant when he was a Trainee, or 
that others did the same or [a] similar thing twenty-two years ago.  Particularly so 
when the Appellant is charged with carrying out the prevention of sexual harassment 
for the City and had undergone sensitivity training merely eight months previously.  
The Victim was defenseless.  As a practical matter a Trainee is not in a position to 
make an assertion against an officer during his/her training period where retention in 
the program or failing the program depends on subjective evaluation.”111 
Type II cases present a very different picture of the influence of societal 
perception on arbitral decision-making.  In Safeway, Inc. v. United Food and 
Commercial Workers Union Local 870,112 a male employee told dirty jokes which 
offended two female employees.  Evidence was presented that these jokes were 
“enjoyed or shrugged off” by most employees, but offended a few young female 
employees.  The arbitrator cited the Meritor and Hensen decisions in finding that the 
grievant created a hostile work environment, especially in view of the company’s 
published policy prohibiting sexual harassment.  He also noted that the grievant was 
an outstanding employee for over twenty years, and had never been disciplined or 
warned about his jokes.  Based upon arbitral precedent, the arbitrator concluded that 
in cases where the grievant did not touch the employee or engage in similar offensive 
conduct, but rather the harassment was limited to verbiage, termination was not the 
appropriate penalty.  He also took note that the grievant testified that he had learned 
his lesson and that there had been a large outpouring of indignation over the 
grievant’s termination from male and female co-workers, retired management, and 
customers.  The termination was reduced to a suspension based upon the grievant’s 
contrition and the appearance that there was a reasonable expectation of 
rehabilitation from this corrective action. 
                                                                
108Id. at 927. 
109Id.  
110Id. 
111Id. at 928. 
112Safeway, Inc. v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 870, 108 Lab. 
Arb. (BNA) 787 (1997). 
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The same result obtained in another Type II case involving Safeway, Inc. v. 
United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 7.113  In this instance a male 
supermarket employee, with over eight years of service to the company, was 
discharged for sexual harassment.  The employee had made various offensive 
comments to female employees in what he claimed was a joking manner.  A month 
before the latest incident, the grievant had been suspended for five days for similar 
conduct.  Until the suspension, the grievant had not been disciplined during his eight-
year tenure for making similar “joking” comments.  The arbitrator reduced the 
termination to a suspension because he was persuaded that the grievant recognized 
the seriousness of his offense and appeared to be capable of rehabilitation.  
According to the arbitrator, “The grievant must understand that he is a dinosaur in 
the modern workplace, and like a dinosaur (i.e., a sexual harasser), he will either 
change or be extinct in the near future.”114 
E.  Advice to Advocates 
The information presented thus far has given you a framework for understanding 
key differences between Type I and Type II sexual harassment cases, shown how 
arbitral decisions parallel decision-making by the courts, and provided an in-depth 
look at how arbitrators decided such cases.  As an advocate, it is your responsibility 
to make appropriate use of information like this when you represent either a union or 
an employer in a sexual harassment case.  It is important to recognize that the 
advocate’s job begins well before a case ever reaches the hearing stage.  The way 
you use such information during the preparation phase can have a major impact on 
the results you achieve whether in arbitration or in settlement before arbitration.  As 
an advocate, you are, of course, under pressure from the party you serve to prevail if 
a sexual harassment case goes to arbitration.  To help you make the best use of our 
analysis; we provide the following advice. 
1.  Selection of the Arbitrator 
Parties to a collective bargaining agreement obtain arbitrators primarily in two 
ways.  They ask for a panel from either the Federal Mediation and Conciliation 
Service (FMCS) or the American Arbitration Association (AAA) or they build an 
arbitrator(s) into their collective bargaining agreement.  In either instance 
‘homework’ is important, but may not be dispositive.  Obviously the first part of this 
‘homework’ is to find out if the arbitrators on the FMCS/AAA list, or the arbitrators 
suggested for inclusion in the agreement, have decided sexual harassment cases.  The 
way an arbitrator has decided other types of cases may not necessarily be indicative 
of his/her reasoning in harassment cases.  As illustrated by the foregoing analysis, 
perception, in addition to the facts, policy, and/or law, plays a role in the way 
arbitrators regard the misconduct alleged.  If the answer is ‘yes’ then what you will 
want to examine carefully is the arbitrator’s reasoning, remembering that he/she can 
only decide based upon the evidence presented.  Resist the temptation simply to look 
at an arbitrator’s win-lose record because this is the least reliable predictor of 
decision-making in any type of case.  With respect to arbitrators whom the parties 
                                                                
113Safeway, Inc. v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 7, 109 Lab. Arb. 
(BNA) 768 (1997) (DiFalco, Arb.). 
114Id. at 774. 
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build into their collective bargaining agreements, it is evident that in so doing most 
parties do not even consider sexual harassment decision-making as a factor.  It is 
worthwhile for parties to consider not only the traditional factors they have relied 
upon in building arbitrators into their agreement, but also this element of workplace 
behavior.  
Reviewing arbitral awards is not always possible since the vast preponderance of 
awards is not published.  For example, NAA arbitrators cannot submit any award for 
publication without the permission of both parties, and even when permission is 
obtained, both BNA and CCH make the final decision about which awards they will 
publish.  Notwithstanding this limitation, advocates should always include a search 
for a published award in the preparation phase.  They also need to utilize this 
information in a meaningful way by examining the arbitrator’s reasoning.   
A final note. As an advocate, you must be aware that men, historically and 
contemporaneously, have decided a preponderance of sexual harassment cases. This 
is understandable because men have and still dominate the neutral arbitration 
profession.  As illustrated by the cases discussed in the foregoing analysis, this is no 
evidence that male arbitrators are more likely than female arbitrators to address the 
issue with detachment.  An obvious fact is that sexual harassment cases, including 
same sex harassment,  involve alleged misconduct by a male.  In selecting arbitrators 
from either FMCS/AAA list or for inclusion in their agreement, wise advocates will 
recognize that the gender of the arbitrator, like his/her win-lose record is of de minis 
importance.  
2.  Opening Statement 
The opening statement creates a road map for the arbitrator to follow in picking 
his/her way through the facts, evidence, and arguments.  It is unwise to clutter this 
map with extraneous information, hyperbole, and sarcasm.  These can confuse the 
arbitrator or cause him/her to turn off so their attention is not focused when an 
advocate does make an important point.  It is incumbent upon advocates to carefully 
prepare a clear, concise, logical statement of the case. 
When the grievant’s advocate believes the client has strong arguments under the 
seven tests of just cause, the advocate should try to have the arbitrator decide 
separately the issues of culpability and appropriate penalty, i.e., if the conduct is 
proven, then the penalty was excessive for the offense.  In other cases, an advocate 
must recognize when there is little to argue regarding the conduct at issue and focus 
the arbitrator’s attention on defects in the administration of the discipline, i.e., 
investigation, disparate treatment, past practice, etc. 
An advocate for the employer first needs to understand whether the conduct 
alleged falls under the Type I or the Type II category.  If it can be shown that the 
conduct is clearly egregious, then it is easier to convince an arbitrator that severe 
discipline is warranted.  In Type II cases an employer’s advocate must pay more 
attention to justifying the penalty, demonstrating why it is appropriate for the offense 
proven, and surgically disposing of any possible challenges based upon disparate 
treatment, past practice, etc.  
3.  Arguing External Law 
The external law of sexual harassment found in court decisions can be of 
assistance to advocates.  For example, an advocate for the grievant may be able to 
find case law that contains a fact pattern similar to the allegations made by the 
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employer.  The court may have held that such conduct was not severe or pervasive or 
did not alter the terms and conditions of the victim’s employment.  Although the 
standards of analysis for the law of the shop may differ from the external law, the use 
of sympathetic case law may be persuasive enough to change an arbitrator’s 
perspective of the conduct and, thus, of the appropriate penalty for same.  This is 
especially true if the employer’s sexual harassment policy merely restates the 
external law.  Arbitrator should be sympathetic to the argument that if the conduct at 
issue was not found to be sexual harassment by a court, then similar conduct under 
parallel policy should not be found to be sexual harassment.  Parallel policy opens 
the door for the advocate to argue severity and pervasiveness, and most important, to 
argue that there is no evidence that the victim’s terms and conditions of employment 
were in any way affected by the harassment at issue.115 
4.  Advantages of Remorse and of Telling the Truth 
In cases where the grievant is clearly culpable and even the best prepared and 
most eloquent advocate cannot stem the tide, it is worthwhile to carefully consider 
preparing the grievant to show remorse, apologize, and promise that the conduct will 
not happen again.  These can help convince an arbitrator that there is a reasonable 
expectation of rehabilitation and, thus, to opting for something less than discharge as 
appropriate penalty.  Advocates should first make the employer establish its prima 
facie case by engaging in rigorous cross-examination executed in a way calculated 
not to victimize the accuser or antagonize the arbitrator.  If the employer’s case holds 
firm, then the advocate should be ready to consider remorse and apology when the 
grievant testifies.  A remorseful grievant who has admitted the essential facts can 
mitigate against the penalty imposed if the employer appears to be vindictive, to 
have embellished the facts, failed to investigate properly, etc.  
It does not take extensive research to discover the number of instances where the 
testimony of the alleged harasser makes the case worse, thus ensuring that the 
discipline will be upheld.  Some arbitrators apply the “you lie, you die” credibility 
test and may be predisposed to give less weight to the seven tests of just cause if the 
grievant is sworn to tell the truth, and then obviously lies in testimony. 
5.  Do Not Testify if the Employer Fails to Provide Live Witness Testimony  
(i.e., Don’t Fight Ghosts) 
When the alleged victim will not testify,116 the first thing an advocate should do is 
research with the goal of selecting an arbitrator who will not take hearsay testimony 
and/or allow an affidavit that cannot be cross-examined.  This advice should be taken 
very seriously because this type of case can be won or lost by the selection of the 
arbitrator. 
If an arbitrator admits hearsay, which is permissible in arbitration, it is important 
for advocates to effectively and appropriately use objections to forestall admission of 
secondary and tertiary hearsay.  Many arbitrators will sustain such an objection if it 
                                                                
115For a good example of how egregious sexual harassment may nevertheless be found by 
a court not to constitute illegal sexual harassment see Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp 657 (E.D. 
Ark. 1998).  
116See supra for discussion of Metropolitan Council Transit Operations v. Amalgamated 
Transit Union Local 1005, 106 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 68 (1996) (Daly, Arb.). 
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is made, but will not insert themselves if the advocate is silent.  In the latter case, an 
advocate loses control over what goes into the record and frees the arbitrator to place 
whatever weight he/she deems appropriate on secondary and tertiary hearsay in 
fashioning an award. 
When an arbitrator admits hearsay and/or affidavits, it is imperative that an 
advocate does everything reasonable to prevent the grievant from providing the 
corroborating testimony.117  If there are no other witnesses, then an advocate has to 
make a very important judgment call based upon his/her ‘read’ of the arbitrator at the 
hearing and the research done at the time of selection.  In general, an advocate is 
probably in a better position if he/she argues that the employer has failed to provide 
direct evidence of the alleged offense, deprived the grievant of the due process right 
to cross-examine the accuser, and rest the case without calling the grievant.  The one 
exception is when the advocate is convinced that the grievant did not engage in the 
conduct at issue and will easily exculpate him/herself by testifying.  As experienced 
advocates know, this is seldom the case.  If the employer does call corroborating 
witnesses, an advocate should actively question why the victim could not testify and 
hammer this point home in the closing arguments.  Unless an employer can produce 
legitimate evidence that the victim was threatened, subjected to other substantial 
coercion, or minority status really justified failure to testify, many arbitrators tend to 
view employer arguments for not producing the victim as insincere. 
6.  Effective Use of Requests for Information 
The grievant’s advocate should make detailed information requests for all 
affidavits, correspondence, documents, and all other information that relates to the 
grievant’s discipline and to any other employee, management or union, who has been 
disciplined for the same/or similar offense.118  While this is a legitimate endeavor, 
sometimes advocates use this as a ‘fishing expedition.’  Such activity is strongly 
discouraged and can be used by an employer to challenge the credibility of your 
request(s) and, potentially your case.  However, when a legitimate request for 
information is denied, there is recourse in terms of filing an unfair labor practice 
charge and/or making this known to the arbitrator at the outset of the hearing.  
Advocates must be dutiful in informing the arbitrator of such denial at the outset of 
the case before testimony and evidence is presented.  Most arbitrators will not allow 
an employer to use information in support of its case that it has denied to the 
grievant/union prior to the proceedings.  More importantly, it is possible that a 
negative inference may even be from such denial.  If, for any reason, an arbitrator 
admits evidence that you requested/haven’t seen before, then it is incumbent upon an 
advocate to ask the arbitrator for time to read the information and, if appropriate, for 
                                                                
117It is worth mentioning a technical point with respect to affidavits that may or may not 
be persuasive to arbitrators.  Both federal and state civil procedure requires that certain “magic 
words” be used in the attestation clause.  It is often the case that these words are not used by 
employer advocates/attorneys in obtaining an affidavit.  This failure can be fodder for a 
procedural argument, but surely no advocate should consider this as a pivotal consideration in 
an arbitrator’s determination of the outcome of a case. 
118It is difficult for an employer to argue that it has a “zero tolerance” policy that requires 
severe discipline, up to and including discharge, if other employees and/or members of 
management have not been treated similarly as evidenced by our discussion of disparate 
treatment in the foregoing analysis. 
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a recess or continuation to prepare a response.  Most arbitrators will grant this 
request if the advocate makes it.  If the advocate simply reacts with hostility, then 
he/she goes forward at their own peril.  However, many arbitrators will draw a 
negative inference if an employer has withheld information legitimately requested.  
Advocates also should not forget that they have the option, in the preparation phase, 
to ask the arbitrator to subpoena information legitimately requested but denied by the 
employer.  Once again, this reinforces the importance of good preparation and 
reinforces the link between preparation and the outcome of the case. 
7.  Keep Your Witnesses on the Team 
A substantial amount of time often elapses between the issuance of discipline for 
sexual harassment and an arbitration hearing.  An effective advocate should stay in 
regular touch with witnesses to make sure they stay on board and/or have not been 
subjected to intimidation, and to find out if they have additional information not 
reported initially, including recollection of other alleged witnesses.  When a witness 
is left out in the cold and suddenly receives a call to testify, the witness it not 
prepared and recollections can fade or are blocked.  Especially where the grievant 
has been discharged, an on-going relationship with a witness(es) still on the job can 
provide an important source of information that may be helpful to your case. 
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